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Mel T. Devine, Marianna Russo and Paul Cuffe, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper proposes a new mechanism for forward
selling renewable electricity generation. In this transactive frame-
work, a wind or solar farm may directly sell to consumers a
claim on their future power output in the form of nonfungible
blockchain tokens. Using the flexibility of smart contract code,
which executes irrevocably on a blockchain, the realised genera-
tion levels will offset the token holders’ electricity consumption
in near real-time. To elucidate the flexibility offered by such
smart contracts, two ways of structuring these power delivery
instruments are considered: firstly, an exotic tranched system,
where more senior tokens holders enjoy priority claims on power,
as compared against a simpler pro-rata scheme, where the realised
output of a generator is equally apportioned between token
holders. A notional market simulation is provided to explore
whether, for instance, consumers could exploit the flatter power
delivery profiles of more senior tranches to better schedule their
responsive demands.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS paper explores how claims on future electricityproduction can be directly traded between generators and
consumers through blockchain in a cyber-physical marketplace.
While a literature is emerging on tokenised paradigms [1], [2]
for peer-to-peer trading of electrical energy [3], the market
framework proposed here takes an alternative structure, where
power contracts for future delivery [4] are transacted on the
blockchain. These claims on future generation could be embod-
ied as nonfungible blockchain tokens [5], with future electrical
power delivery as the underlying asset [6], [7]. Therefore the
claims can be qualified as a cyber-physical forward contract
for a blockchain application within a decentralised electricity
markets [8].
The increased demand for power system flexibility, driven
by less passive buyers and more active users, is resulting in
more complex interactions in the distribution network, e.g.
demand side management and distributed energy resources
[9], [10]. With the progressive phase-out of renewable energy
subsidies [11], peer-to-peer mechanisms for forward trading
could have significant value in offering the flexibility required
to coordinate more complex generator-load dynamics [4], and
can likewise stabilise revenues for renewable generators in
the transition towards sustainable power systems. As subsidies
expire and renewable energy penetration increases, the value
that renewable generators are able to capture in the centralised
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(wholesale) market is decreasing, especially in those areas
where renewable installed capacity and generation profile are
more (and positively) correlated with the amount of national
subsidies, as in Europe [12] and China [11].
In recent years, research has emerged which focuses on
evaluating the potential of the so-called energy internet (i.e.
the synergistic combination of renewable energy sources and
information technologies) as an instrument for the flexible and
economic management of distributed energy systems [10], [13],
[14]. In such systems, electricity is generated by maximising
the exploitation of renewable sources in a distributed fashion
and so to dynamically adjust the electricity utilisation within
the grid [15] [16].
Blockchain represents a promising new technology for energy
management, automated control and energy trading in the
decentralised and distributed framework of the energy internet.
Modern blockchains [17] allow financial arrangements of
arbitrary complexity [18] to be embedded as scripts, often called
smart contracts or chaincode, which execute in a decentralised
fashion beyond the interference of any one party. This would
allow tokenised power delivery claims to be immutably settled
in near real-time with zero counter-party risk (see [19] for more
on this disruptive paradigm).
Blockchain-enabled smart contracts have been exploited
in the context of decentralised systems and secure peer-to-
peer trading to facilitate demand response [10], [20], [21].
As one speculative proposal for how the flexibility of such
smart contracts could be exploited, this paper proposes a novel
way to apportion the real-time output of a generator between
diverse token holders: tranching. This novel tranching structure
is proposed firstly to explore its usefulness for managing the
volatility of power delivery, and also as a case study of the exotic
new instruments that blockchain technology could support in a
cyber-physical electricity marketplace.
Under the proposed tranching structure, a generator’s real-
time output is continuously divided into a senior, a middle and
a junior tranche. All power produced below a certain threshold
is first allocated to the senior tranche: only when this level is
exceeded does the middle tranche gain a claim on the power,
and likewise for the junior tranche. Notably, the shape of these
tranches’ outputs will be quite different. As the senior tranche
can be anticipated to provide uninterrupted blocks of constant
power over sustained periods, it may facilitate the activation
of responsive demands that have inter-temporal constraints or
cycling costs (e.g charging a battery, where it is undesirable
to interrupt the charging once it has begun) Tranches are not
fungible and therefore allow renewable generators to target
power delivery contracts to particular market segments: this
overcomes the anonymous commodification of electrical energy.
Simple pro-rata division of a wind farm’s output does not
2provide discrimination between claims: fluctuations in the total
power output of the farm will be reflected in each associated
token, which may limit the ability to use such forward-bought
electricity to offset the energy costs of responsive demands. It
is also arguable that a tranching structure such as this provides
consumers with a more tangible sense of association with a
specific renewable generator, as this scheme can put them ‘first
in the queue’ for electrical power flowing from an identifiable
wind turbine.
Section II presents a simple marketplace simulation frame-
work. Section III describes the data used in the test platform
and the smart contract pricing. In Section IV, the results are
presented and discussed. Section V concludes the paper.
II. METHODOLOGY
A. Representative market framework
1) Assumptions: Firstly, it is assumed that generators and
consumers are equipped with blockchain-aware smart elec-
tricity meters, as in [18] (the feasability and implementation
details of such supportive infrastructure is outside this paper’s
narrow scope.) Each consumer’s meter can be ‘credited’ with
blockchain tokens that embody a claim on a portion of the
future power output of a particular generator. (How this real-
time production data may be credibly oraclised [22] is likewise
beyond the present scope.) These ForDelToks blockchain tokens
could be freely and anonymously traded between actors, perhaps
using decentralised exhanges [23].
In each time period, each consumer’s meter queries a smart
contract to infer how much of its consumption is offset by the
real-time output of the ForDelToks it holds. Consumption in
excess of this level must be paid for at a fixed pay-as-you-go
rate [18], perhaps also using a blockchain payment system.
2) Market principles: If the ‘output’ of a ForDelTok exceeds
a consumer’s instantaneous consumption, the surplus provides
no benefit to the consumer: a principle of use it or lose it.
Each ForDelTok is valid for a particular timespan and embeds
particular rules for how the generator’s power output will be
dispersed amongst ForDelTok holders. As a blockchain token,
each ForDelTok could be freely traded without restrictions.
However, the simple market model presented here only con-
siders first-party trades between generators and consumers:
third-party and derivative markets are beyond the scope of
the present work, although they are fully facilitated within the
blockchain paradigm.
B. ForDelTok Allocation model
This section describes an optimisation model that identifies
equilibrium conditions for an idealised marketplace which has
some resemblance to a ForDelTok exchange platform. It is
important to note that blockchain decentralised exchanges are
flexible and unrestricted: they are not operated according to
strict trading rules nor cleared by any central party. The present
optimisation model is only proposed to identify the types of
equilibrium that such a vibrant and open marketplace might
tend to converge towards. This will facilitate a discussion of
the potential benefits of such schemes: this allocation model
is not proposed as a set of rules for operating a blockchain
marketplace, but only as an illustrative simulation.
The ForDelTok market is simulated using a cost minimisa-
tion allocation model whereby the ForDelToks contracts are
allocated from the generators to the consumers so as minimise
the sum of consumer costs. A cost minimisation approach
should find a similar equilibrium to that acheived in an efficient
marketplace [24] where generators and consumers can transact
with each other bilaterally without regulation.
The following nomenclature is used: lower-case Roman
letters indicate indices or primal variables while upper-case
Roman letters represent parameters.
The model minimises total consumer cost over T timesteps
by determining the energy (coni,k,t) consumer group k gets
from contract i at time t in addition to the pay-as-you-go
energy they buy (nk,t). A binary variable is used to indicate if
consumer group k holds contract i (di,k = 1) or not (di,k = 0).
Consumers have two types of demand: un-shift-able demand
(DEMk,t), which must be consumed at time t, and shift-able
demand (drk,t), which must also be consumed but the time
at which this happens is optimally determined by the model.
The binary variable bk,l represents when consumer k begin
consuming it’s shift-able demand; bk,l = 1 if at time l and






P × nk,t +
∑
i,t,k
P × CON i,t × di,k (1)
subject to:
DEMk,t + drk,t = nk,t +
∑
i
coni,k,t, ∀k, t, (2)
coni,k,t ≤ CON i,t × di,k, ∀i, k, t, (3)∑
k




Ek,l,t × bk,l, ∀k, t, (5)
∑
l
bk,l = 1, ∀k, (6)
drk,t ≤ DRk,t, ∀k, t, (7)
where P represents the pay-as-you-go price consumers
pay to a liquidity provider. The price P represents the price
generators would receive for their energy from the liquidity
provider and thus represents the minimum price they would
be willing to sell to the consumers at. The total consumer
costs in objective function (1) represent consumers’ pay-as-
you-go cost in addition to their ForDelTok costs. Note that
consumers would have to pay just marginally more than the P
floor price for each unit of energy in the ForDelTok, regardless
of whether they use it: this is the lowest price a generator would
theoretically accept. Constraint (2) ensures demand balances
for each consumer at each timestep. Constraint (3) limits the
amount of energy consumer group receives at time t from
contract i. If contract energy available in timestep t is greater
than consumer k’s demand, then some of the contract will
not be utilised. Constraint (4) ensures contract i can only be
3Fig. 1. An example of how the tranching scheme operates, showing the
division of g1’s output for day 2
Fig. 2. An example of how the prorata scheme operates, showing the division
of g1’s output for day 2
given to, at most, one consumer. Constraint (5) determines
the shift-able demand each consumer group consumes at time
t where the parameter Ek,l,t represents consumer group k’s
shift-able demand at time t if their begin consuming their shift-
able demand at time l. Constraint (6) ensures each consumer
group k must begin consuming its shift-able load at some
point. Constraint (7) limits when consumer k can shift their
demand to. The parameter DRk,t = 0 if consumer k cannot
shift their demand to timestep t. Otherwise, DRk,t =∞. These
constraints ensure that once consumers begin consuming their
shift-able demand, they must continue. This type of demand
response corresponds to processes which run for a set period
of time, such as the charging of a car or specific manufacturing
activities.
Finally, all variables are also constrained to be non-negative.
III. TEST PLATFORM
A. Test data
The market simulation involves the application of the
representative market framework to the Australian system
on two typical summer days [25]–[27]. Wind contribution to
seasonal peak demand is generally higher in summer than in
winter in Australia based on [28]. Each daily profile consists of
48 half-hourly wind generation and consumer load of Australian
Energy Market Operator. Due to the scope of this paper, a
simplified yet representative framework for the wind generator-
load dynamics is considered. Data regarding the output of three
wind generators was taken from [29] to represent the future
electrical power delivery underlying the ForDelTok contracts,
as shown as sparklines in tables II and III. Five different








k1 59 2 1
2
09:00 17:00
k2 170 3 09:00 17:00
k3 138 3 1
2
10:00 18:30
k4 104 3 09:00 17:00
k5 51 3 09:00 19:30
load profiles where retrieved from [30] to mimic the real-time
demand of consumer groups. These load profiles, after some
demand response shifting, are shown in yellow in figure 3.
The marketplace equilibrium problem is a Mixed Integer
Linear Program and is solved using GAMS with an optimally
gap of 0.0. Demand response parameters are as given in table
I. Market-making price parameters were set at P = 25 and
P = 16.
1) Construction of equal energy tranches: To partition the
time series data into the equal-energy tranches an algorithm it-
erated through candidate power thresholds until each ForDelTok
contained approximately one third of the total energy produced
by each generator for each day. Examples of this tokenisation
process are given in figures 1, which shows three ForDelTok
representing junior, middle, and senior tranches of a particular
wind farm’s output. As a comparison, figure 2 shows the simple
pro rata division of a wind farm’s output.
B. Determining ForDelTok prices
The optimization model does not explicitly determine the
specific price each consumer will pay the generator for
each ForDelTok they purchase. If all the consumers were to
behave completely rationally and seek the best price from the
generators, the ForDelTok price would tend to £P /kWh as the
generators would compete amongst each other until that floor
price was reached. Similarly, if there was not even one consumer
willing to do this, generators could set the price at £P /kWh
so as to maximise their profits. When the ForDelTok price is
£P /kWh, consumers do not benefit from the ForDelToks as
they would pay the same as pay-as-you-go price. Similarly, if
the ForDelTok price is £P /kWh, generators would not benefit.
In reality, some consumers behave rationally and others do
not [31] and thus it can be anticipated that the price of the
ForDelToks ForDelToks will lie between P and P and both
consumer and generators may gain financially.
IV. RESULTS
The raw data and scripts underlying these results are available
at [32].
The market simulation was undertaken to verify whether
the flexibility offered by peer-to-peer smart contracts on a
blockchain could be exploited to coordinate and optimise wind
generation-load dynamics in electricity networks. Tables II and
III show the allocation of each ForDelToks contract i from
every generator g to each consumer group k under the tranched
and pro-rata systems during two typical summer days. The
allocation process maximises the generator’s revenue gain and
the consumer’s saving by assuming a floor ForDelTok price
P , at which generators may sell to the liquidity provider, and
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i9 Tr Junior g3 −→ k2 3.51 3.38 £0.28 £0.30
i8 Tr Middle g3 −→ k3 3.56 3.56 £0.32 £0.32
i7 Tr Senior g3 −→ k3 3.54 3.54 £0.32 £0.32
i6 Tr Junior 2.63 0 £-0.42 £0
i5 Tr Middle g2 −→ k3 2.65 2.65 £0.24 £0.24
i4 Tr Senior g2 −→ k4 2.64 2.64 £0.24 £0.24
i3 Tr Junior 1.44 0 £-0.23 £0
i2 Tr Middle g1 −→ k2 1.46 1.46 £0.13 £0.13




i9 Pro Rata g3 −→ k2 3.54 3.46 £0.30 £0.31
i8 Pro Rata g3 −→ k2 3.54 3.16 £0.22 £0.28
i7 Pro Rata g3 −→ k3 3.54 3.42 £0.29 £0.31
i6 Pro Rata g2 −→ k4 2.64 2.57 £0.22 £0.23
i5 Pro Rata g2 −→ k2 2.64 2.56 £0.22 £0.23
i4 Pro Rata g2 −→ k3 2.64 2.43 £0.19 £0.22
i3 Pro Rata g1 −→ k3 1.46 1.41 £0.12 £0.13
i2 Pro Rata g1 −→ k1 1.46 1.05 £0.03 £0.09




TABLE III. ForDelTok ALLOCATION: DAY 2








i9 Tr Junior 6.35 0 £-1.02 £0
i8 Tr Middle g3 −→ k2 6.43 6.06 £0.49 £0.55
i7 Tr Senior g3 −→ k3 6.42 6.33 £0.56 £0.57
i6 Tr Junior 11.84 0 £-1.89 £0
i5 Tr Middle 11.89 0 £-1.90 £0
i4 Tr Senior 11.93 0 £-1.91 £0
i3 Tr Junior 4.68 0 £-0.75 £0
i2 Tr Middle 4.74 0 £-0.76 £0
i1 Tr Senior g1 −→ k4 4.76 4.60 £0.39 £0.41∑
= £− 6.79 ∑ = £1.53
i9 Pro Rata g3 −→ k2 6.40 6.22 £0.53 £0.56
i8 Pro Rata 6.40 0 £-1.02 £0
i7 Pro Rata g3 −→ k3 6.40 5.83 £0.43 £0.52
i6 Pro Rata 11.88 0 £-1.90 £0
i5 Pro Rata 11.88 0 £-1.90 £0
i4 Pro Rata 11.88 0 £-1.90 £0
i3 Pro Rata g1 −→ k4 4.73 4.16 £0.28 £0.37
i2 Pro Rata 4.73 0 £-0.76 £0
i1 Pro Rata 4.73 0 £-0.76 £0∑
= £− 6.99 ∑ = £1.46
5Day
One
Tranched ForDelTok regime Pro Rata ForDelTok regime
Day
Two
Fig. 3. This table shows each consumers final daily consumption in yellow, with the portion of this supplied by the aggregate of their purchased ForDelToks
contracts shown in green. The portion of energy purchased but not consumed is shown in red. The tickmarks on the horizontal axis indicate the start and end
times for demand response activation












Tranched ForDelTok regime 1310 18% 98%
Pro Rata ForDelTok regime 1359 18% 88%
Day 2
Tranched ForDelTok regime 815 19% 97%
Pro Rata ForDelTok regime 874 8% 93%













Max gen revenue gain £ 0.95 1.64 0
Max gen revenue gain % 46% 79% -
Max consumer cost saving £ 1.66 1.91 0
Max consumer savings % 81% 93% -
Mean token energy utilisation % 81% 92% NA
Day 2
Max gen revenue gain £ -6.79 -6.99 0
Max gen revenue gain % −109% −113% -
Max consumer cost saving £ 1.53 1.46 0
Max consumer savings % 25% 23% -
Mean token energy utilisation % 25% 23% NA
a ceiling P , set by the price at which consumers can buy
electricity from the liquidity provider.
The energy content of the ForDelToks contracts under the
tranched and the pro-rata allocation regimes is equivalent: the
same delivery of electrical energy is available in each case. No-
tably, though, the real-time demand of each consumer actually
satisfied by the ForDelToks contracts differs between the two
differentiation regimes. Specifically, the energy utilisation of
senior tranches (i1, i4, i7) is maximised in the tranched system
compared to the pro-rata regime. This is mostly evident in
Day 1 (Table II), when consumer groups k3, k4 and k5 benefit
from a higher energy use in the tranched system, particularly
during the middle of the day (9.00 a.m. to 9.00 p.m.), that is
when the availability of flexible load is higher, as shown by
the sparklines.
The dynamics implied in Tables II and III are documented
in Figure 3, which depicts the consumers final daily consump-
tion (yellow) and the portion of this consumption satisfied
through ForDelToks contracts (green) over the 2 days in the
different regimes. Overall, the figure shows a more efficient
implementation of energy trading through a tranched system
compared to a pro-rata system: note how the flat green
power delivery blocks on the left side result in less unutilised
ForDelToks entitlement (red). The uninterrupted blocks of
constant power over prolonged periods are more frequent when
the discriminatory regime is on place, such as in Day 1 for
consumer groups k3, k4 and k5, and in Day 2 for consumer
groups k2, k3 and k4. Furthermore, the tranched system
maximises the allocation of the energy flow across consumers
thus optimising their shiftable load and reducing the amount of
energy that is purchased but not utilised by the consumers (red
areas in the figure). Consequently, the tranched ForDelToks
regime would better accommodate the efficient activation of
demand response with intertemporal constraints or cycling
costs, such as an energy storage system, including plug-in
electric vehicles. Therefore, results in this paper add to previous
research focusing on the application of blockchain techniques
to peer-to-peer energy trading and automated demand response
in decentralised system [33], [10].
A. Effect on load profile shape
The tableau in figure 3 shows how demand response
activiations vary between the two regimes (start and finish
times for these are shown as tick marks on the horizontal axis)
Along the left hand side, it can be seen where these activations
are optimally shifted to fit inside times when a particular
consumer is well-supplied by ForDelTok power: for instance,
load k3 on day one. The general flatness of power delivery
profiles to the left is quite noticable, with power delivery on the
right fluctuating in a way that causes more spillage of unused
tokenised power.
Interestingly, in this study the optimisation of demand
responses would be achieved through the specific structure
of the ForDelToks contract and delivery system, rather than by
time-of-use prices, thus limiting possible new demand peaks
caused by the same low price periods [25], [34]. Table IV
reports the peak-to-valley power shift in the two regimes,
which is defined as the difference between the maximum
and minimum total load in Figure 3, net of the ForDelTok
utilisation. Both in Day 1 and Day 2, the tranched regime
limits the net load peak-to-valley (1310 kW and 815 kW in
Day 1 and Day 2 respectively) compared to the pro-rata regime
(1359 kW and 874 kW). This outcome has implications for
the interaction between concentrated shifts of reschedulable
demand and power grid stability [35] [36]. The effect of the
discriminatory system in limiting the creation of new demand
peaks can be also inferred from the relative peak reduction in
Table IV, which is obtained from the ratio of the maximum
total load to the maximum load net of the used ForDelToks, as
depicted in Figure 3. Overall, the tranched ForDelToks regime
allows for a somewhat higher peak reduction (18% and 19%
in Day 1 and Day 2, respectively) when compared to the peak
reduction achievable through a pro-rata regime (18% and 9%).
This evidence implies a more efficient allocation of the power
delivery ForDelToks in the tranched regime, resulting in an
utilisation of the activated ForDelToks of 98% and 97% in
Day 1 and Day 2 respectively, relative to 88% and 93% of the
pro-rata regime.
B. Market out-turn analysis
Results in this paper contribute to address the advantages
of blockchain in facilitating the participation of demand-
side (consumers) in energy system management [10] [37].
Furthermore, these results suggest how, in energy markets,
the token economy can encourage energy trading in the future
low-carbon electrical industry [38]. Table V summarises the
market out-turns from the simulation exercise. In Day 1, the
utilisation of all available ForDelToks contracts is above 80%
under both the regimes. Whilst the pro-rata regime maximises
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total generators’ revenues and consumers’ saving, it can hamper
an efficient activation of demand responses, as implied by the
results in Table IV. Yet, when the total amount of ForDelToks
contracts used is not greater than 25%, as in Day 2, the
tranched system appears to be more suitable to curb wind
generators’ losses. With 75% of wind power plant costs being
upfront capital expenditure with usually high level of debt [39],
stable revenues are crucial for generators. Compared to a pro-
rata system, a discriminatory allocation system improves the
profit effectiveness of wind farms against wind unpredictability,
thus offering generators a risk-hedging instrument other than
modifying offers in short-term markets [40]. This outcome
is particularly interesting when considering the increasing
penetration of renewable energy and the progressive phase-
out of renewable subsidies, which can affect the level of
future investment in renewable generation [11]. Also, whilst
net metering and feed-in tariffs are fixed rates, which actually
decouple generators and consumers from price signals that
might otherwise direct investment and consumption decisions
[41], blockchain-enabled peer-to-peer contracts promote a
decentralised price discovery process for electricity trading
[42] [43].
While this study does not account for the impact of uncertain
real-time prices on purchasing decisions in the forward market
[44], ForDelToks contracts are bilaterally traded at any price
agreed upon generators and consumer groups, regardless of
the market prices. Since the contract price lies between the
minimum price at which generators can sell electricity in the
wholesale market, P , , and the maximum price at which con-
sumers can buy electricity from the market maker, P , any price
uncertainty is absorbed and the effects of the real-time price
distribution in a peer-to-peer forward trading setting become
negligible. This implies that blockchain-based peer-to-peer
ForDelToks forward contracts are less vulnerable to real-time
price volatility and would represent an effective option for price
volatility risk management [6], [7], [19], mostly for generators.
Results in this paper show that generator’s risk management can
be optimised by a discriminatory energy allocation system, such
as the tranched system. Table V shows the maximum generators’
revenue gain and the maximum consumers’ saving in Day 2,
which is characterised by excess of supply (i.e. low energy use
compared to the ForDelToks contracts energy content). Overall,
negative revenues are minimised with a tranched system, while
consumers’ saving is maximised, along with demand responses
(consumer groups k3 and k4). Therefore, as far as futures
markets lead in the real-time price discovery process [45], the
proposed tranched system would represent a more efficient
way not only to deliver price information on energy costs to
consumers, but also to facilitate effective risk management and
appropriate investments in renewable generation capacity. In
such a context, the proposed tranching structure contributes to
the recent research blockchain-enabled smart contracts design in
distributed peer-to-peer energy systems [21]. Furthermore, while
at the present, research mainly focuses on future applications
of blockchain-enabled distributed energy resources, [21], [46],
[47], the blockchain-enabled smart contract design proposed
in this study is for the trading of power contracts for future
delivery, thus representing a further application of smart contract
technology in distributed energy management.
C. Limitations
The analysis does not allow for market uncertainty or market
power in the trading relationship between renewable generators
and consumers [48] [44] [4]. Scalability and costs are further
issues when considering the properties of decentralisation and
supply security [47], which are not considered in this study.
These aspects are left for future research.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A peer-to-peer platform has been proposed for the forward
trading of tokenised power delivery contracts, where blockchain
technology is integrated as a cyber-layer in a decentralised
system and used for electricity trading. Results show that these
cyber-physical forward contracts can yield better outcomes
for consumers while maximising wind generators revenues.
The contribution of this study is to show that a discriminatory
blockchain-based forward trading system, such as the proposed
tranched system, can provide a more effective incentive for
demand response and smart management of energy consumption
compared to a more naive pro-rata regime. Results also show the
superiority of such a discriminatory system in facilitating renew-
able generators’ risk management and for consumer-oriented
marketplaces to support decentralised renewable generation.
Therefore, blockchain technology and the proposed cyber-
physical forward trading system would support the development
and operation of decentralised energy systems and smart grids.
While the discriminatory approach in this paper can enable more
efficient and flexible decentralised markets, some limitations
to the undertaken analysis should be acknowledged.
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